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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to outline an analytical framework which captures the ample
scope of locational competition: cost differences, resulting from differences in factor prices
including taxes, human capital, infrastructure services and total factor productivity. If cost
differences are small, locational competition controls excessive government power. We have
modeled locational competition by assuming that governments have a vital interest to keep
mobile factors of production at home. We represent this aspect by restricting the usage of
environmental instruments such that they will at most exhaust the cost difference to a
competing foreign firm. If cost differences are large enough there is no binding restriction for
the cost-benefit calculus of a national environmental policy. The tax will be below marginal
damage due to strategic reasons of rent shifting. If small international cost differences do not
allow taxation in accordance with marginal damage considerations, then locational
competition restricts the size of the tax rate such that the firm is indifferent in relocating or
staying at home. If no cost differences exist, it is even possible that both governments will
subsidize the pollution intensive input in order to make the domestic location attractive.
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2Locational Competition under Environmental Regulation
when Input Prices and Productivity Differ
1. Introduction
It is argued in the literature that differences in environmental regulations are an important
factor in industrial location (industrial flight hypothesis). This hypothesis is derived from an
extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage. Since companies can
avoid regulations by locating abroad, free trade erodes the independence of a country in
implementing an environmental policy. This exerts a strong pressure towards lax regulation in
order to signal a pollution haven to producers. Especially in the theoretical literature,
multinational firms seem to base their direct foreign investment decision or plant location
upon the stringency of environmental regulation in other countries (developing countries or
Eastern Europe). The environmental regulation intensity is expected to be a significant
determinant of competitiveness and causes industrial flight from developed countries. The
argument is that stringent environmental standards cause high costs of production, leading to
a decline in competitiveness, and ultimately in market share, jobs and investments. In
countries with persistently high unemployment, threats of job losses and of plant relocation
can be very powerful and helpful for opponents of a strict environmental policy. 1 However, a
broad consensus has emerged in the empirical literature that regulatory differences (with some
exceptions) have, at best, a negligible impact on industrial location. Studies attempting to
measure the effect of environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, and plan-
location decisions have produced estimates that are either small or statistically insignificant.
These results emerged from studies  by Jaffe et al. (1995) and Adams (1995) which review the
empirical evidence.
We therefore will specify a model which permits the option to relocate but in which
governments will not set environmental taxes or standards such that firms will choose this
option. In this model location decisions do not only depend on regulatory differences, but also
on differences in factor prices, in the quality of the labor force, access to markets, differences
in corporate taxes or in the provision of infrastructure. Governments know these factors which
can affect business location decisions and they also know that it is rather unlikely that firms
will move to another country for the only reason of taking advantage of relatively lax
                                                                
1  See Jaffe et al. (1995) and Adams (1995) for excellent surveys on environmental regulation and
competitiveness.
3 environmental standards.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce international productivity gaps into a model
on relocation decisions and to show that there is plenty of room for strict regulation if
countries are not too similar in terms of productivity and factor price differences. With
productivity gaps between countries, it is hopeless to lure business into another country by
providing low environmental standards. In our special model, governments might extent
exploit the cost advantage of their domestic firms to a certain extent by adding an
environmentally motivated regulatory burden, but they will set this burden low enough such
that it will not cause firms to relocate existing plants. Therefore this model is in line with a
study by Bartik (1988) who found that air and water pollution control expenditures, costs of
compliance, and allowed particulate emissions all have an insignificant effect on plant
location decisions. Jaffe et al. (1995) summarize the reasons why the effects of environmental
regulation on location decisions may be small. First, for all but the most heavily regulated
industries, the cost of complying with environmental regulation is a relatively small fraction
of total cost of production. Second, labor cost differentials, energy and raw materials cost
differentials and infrastructure adequacy dominate the environmental cost effect. Third, other
monetary-equivalent costs or benefits like public services, unionization of a country’s labor
force, or agglomeration effects from the existing level of manufacturing activity in a region
also affect plant location choices. Fourth, since the difference in environmental regulation in
western industrial countries is not large, the incentive to relocate is small. And fifth, in case
significant differences in regulatory stringency exist, firms may not exploit them. Because of
environmental credibility reasons firms are reluctant to build less-than-state-of-the art plants
in foreign countries, or, when environmental standards are relatively weak, firms may invest
more in pollution control than is required.
 We will now give a short survey of the literature. The first model on location decision
and environmental policy is by Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993). They develop a model
that allows firms to enter or exit, and to change the number and locations of their plants in
response to changes in environmental policies. There are increasing returns at the plant level
(fixed costs), imperfect competition between a domestic and a foreign firm, and transport
costs of shipping out between two markets. The authors consider two countries and assume
that one firm - not yet established at the beginning of the game - is associated with each
country. Firms decide where to set up production after having observed the governments’
move. The decision to serve another region is a discrete choice between the high fixed-cost
option of a foreign branch plant or the high variable-cost option of exporting to that market.
4Decisions on plant locations are no longer based on marginal analysis but are now discrete
choice problems. At critical levels of environmental policy variables, small policy changes
cause large discrete jumps in a region’s pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a
plant, or shifts production to/from a foreign branch plant. They extend their model by
introducing tax competition between the governments of the two regions (Markusen, Morey
and Olewiler (1995)). If the damage from pollution is high enough, the two governments will
compete by increasing their environmental taxes until the polluting firm is driven from the
market. Alternatively, if damage from pollution is not as high, the governments will compete
by undercutting each other’s pollution tax rates. Markusen et al. (1995) use numerical
examples that show the range of parameters that cause a move from one equilibrium to
another. Following them, Hoel (1997) also considers a two-stage game at the firm and at the
government level. Under his assumption that costs of the firms, except taxes, are independent
of where the firms locate, each firm will only produce in one (or none) of the two countries.
Markusen et al. (1995) allow for non-zero transportation costs which implies that it may be
optimal for a firm to locate in both countries in spite of its fixed costs. Hoel’s somewhat
simpler model makes it possible to derive some qualitative results under rather general
assumptions. In the game he considers the governments of the two countries first choose their
tax rates, after which the firm locates in the country with the lowest tax rate. Markusen et al.
and Hoel analyze the case where environmental damage is so large that the firm does not
locate in any of the countries in the Nash equilibrium (the NIMBY case (not in my
backyard)). The main conclusion from the model is that the incentive of each country to
attract firms results in lower environmental taxes than it would be with cooperation. The
model by Rauscher (1995) is another simplified version of Markusen et al. (1995) by
neglecting transportation costs so that a single plant suffices to serve the whole market. In this
paper there is one firm that wishes to establish a plant in one of n countries and the game
between the countries is affected by transboundary pollution effects. It has been shown that
there is a large variety of taxes ranging from zero taxes to taxes as high as to imply the
NIMBY case. In Ulph (1994), several producers of a single industry have to decide where to
locate plants to serve several markets. In a multi-stage game governments first choose their
policies to restrict emissions of a pollutant (no strategic policy), producers then make location
decisions and finally set outputs. In the paper the question is considered whether governments
should offer subsidies to producers to prevent them from relocating to other countries. A
rebate policy of taxes back to the industry is simulated using data for the world fertilizer
industry. Ulph wants to demonstrate that relocation can change the degree of competitiveness
5of different markets. Producers have chosen to locate where there are economies of
agglomeration so that moving into foreign markets sacrifies some of these economies. The
trade-off between these economies and transport costs will be one of the factors affecting
firms in their choice of plant location.
In Motta and Thisse (1994) firms are already established in their home country when
the game begins. They study the impact of the home country’s environmental policy on the
domestic firm’s location while the foreign firm’s location strategy is given. The option for the
domestic firm is to supply both markets from its domestic plant; or to establish a second plant
in the foreign market; or to shut down the home plant and to serve both markets through the
new plant set up in the foreign country. Exports imply transportation costs and environmental
policy that raises marginal cost. They describe the equilibrium configurations by a partition of
the parameter space. The objective is to show that environmental trade barriers may cause
significant welfare losses.2
Location decisions of footloose firms in response to environmental costs are also
analyzed in Markusen (1999), who presents simulation results derived from a numerical
general equilibrium model. In summarizing the results from the main contributions to the
location topic he emphasizes that it is not at all clear that regional competition for mobile
plants leads to lower standards in equilibrium.
The last two papers look at location decision but not in an environmental context.
Venables’ (1996) paper deals with location choice and agglomeration. He demonstrates that
even without labor mobility there are forces leading to agglomeration of activities at particular
locations in an integrated region. Production occurs in both locations when transport costs are
high (firms are tied to markets and their location decisions are much less sensitive to
production costs. In his upstream-downstream industry structure, production also occurs in
both locations when transport costs are low (factor prices then determine location). The paper
focuses on intermediate transport costs and multiple equilibria. The paper by Markusen and
Rutherford (1994) introduces discrete location choices in a general equilibrium approach. In
their model one firm is allowed to endogenously choose among 15 alternative plant-location
configurations. The other firms retain their existing numbers of and locations for their plants,
but endogenously adjust their outputs, markups, and shipment patterns. The focus is on the
North American auto industry in the NAFTA context.
                                                                
2 Two recent discussion papers on strategic location decisions are Petrakis and Xepapadeos (2000) and Greaker
(2000). The former analyze delocation decisions of a monopolist who faces an emission tax in the home country.
The latter look at the strictness of strategic environmental policy when the governments are bounded by the treat
of regulation.
6Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concept of
productivity differences between countries as originated by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978),
and derive a maximal environmental tax which could offset the productivity advantage of an
industry making it indifferent between staying or relocating. In section 3, we introduce
imperfect competition between domestic and foreign firms which differ in terms of factor
prices and total factor productivity. Depending on the difference in the cost of production,
they decide about the siting of their plants. In section 4, we introduce environmental tax
competition between two governments where by each government is concerned about
industrial migration in response to differentials in environmental taxes. In section 5, we
extend our basic model by introducing fixed set up costs for relocating existing plants, and by
analyzing an environmental tax competition, where each government wants to attract
domestic as well as foreign firms by a less stringent environmental policy. Section 6
summarizes our conclusions.
2. Location Decisions under Differences in Factor Prices and in Total Factor
Productivity
We assume that a firm produces the quantity x of output with labor and energy and is flexible
in making the decision about the site of its plant. Let 1D-  be a vector 1 2 3: ( , ,..., )nD D D D- =
with 1jD =  if industry 1 is located in country 1j ¹  and 0 otherwise where country 1 is the
base country. Additionally let 
jL
q  denote the price of labor in country j. With country 1 as the
base country the price of labor qL actually paid by the firm is a function of the location
decision and the price differences with respect to the base country 1 are
(1)
11
( ) and
j
L
L L L L
j
d q
q q D q q
d D-
= = - .
Similarly, let the price of energy be
(2)
1
0
1 1 1( ) ( ) with ( )j
E
E E E E E j
j
d q
q q D t D e q q t t e
d D- -
= + × = - + - ×
7where e is an emission coefficient, e.g. for CO2, and tj is an emission or energy tax which
differs country-wise. The joint cost function then is
(3) 2( , , , ,..., )L E nC C x q q D D=
with jD  as the dummy variable for country j. The differences in regional cost functions are
maintained by the additional argument 1D-  in the cost function. If
(4) 0 (given , and )L E
j
C
q q x
D
¶
>
¶
then relocation from the base country 1 to country j will result in higher costs of production
due to lower productivity in country i. The opposite holds if 0
j
C
D
¶
£
¶
.3
The total difference in costs if the firm migrates from country 1 to country j is
(5)
0
1 1
L E
j j j j j j
d C C d x d q d q d t C
L E e
d D x d D d D d D d D D
æ ö¶ ¶
= × + × + + × +ç ÷ç ÷¶ ¶è ø
where 1 1,
L E
C C
L E
q q
¶ ¶
= =
¶ ¶
 has been used (Shephard’s Lemma). If 0
j
d C
d D
³  for all j, then
the firm will stay in the base country 1. If  0
j
d C
d D
<  for some j, then the firm will migrate to
country 0 argmin , {2,3,..., }
j I j
d C
j I n
d DÎ
= = . According to (5), differences in labor costs, in
energy costs, in environmental regulation and differences in total factor productivity (TFP)
are determinants for a decision to relocate. We have not yet introduced relocation costs or
transportation costs. Differences in infrastructure services, human capital, or R&D activities
                                                                
3 In principle, (4) is a definition since jD  is a discontinuous variable and thus cannot be used to form a partial
derivative. Denny and Fuss (1983) showed that if we had ignored the fact that jD  is discontinuous, and
differentiated C with respect to it we would have obtained a function of a partial derivative defined as such
before.
8are included in the TFP difference term or could be an additional term in the cost function. 4
Since we are interested whether new environmental regulations will cause the firm to relocate
the existing plant, we assume that the firm produces in country 1, i.e., it is 0
j
d C
d D
³  for all j. 
Therefore our approach emphasizes not only differences in factor prices and in
environmental policy, but especially differences in national productivity. The next step is to
introduce imperfect competition and environmental policy regulation in order to model the
strategic interdependency of location decisions by firms and environmental policies by
governments.
3. Location Decisions and Imperfect Competition
We suppose there is a single firm in each of two countries which operates only one plant to
serve the entire world market. We assume that each unit energy used produces one unit of
pollution (i.e. e = 1), and that there is no abatement technology. Pollution affects only the
country in which the plant is located, and government in each country imposes an emission or
energy tax. The structure of the moves will be that the two governments first commit
themselves to a level of emission tax; then the firms decide to stay or to relocate. Besides
ecological dumping as a lax environmental policy to stabilize market shares of the domestic
firm, there is additional pressure on governments to relax their environmental policies if
plants are able to relocate. We assume that the production process is the same in both
countries but that factor prices and TFP differ. The corresponding fixed costs are sunk when
the game begins. Hence firm 1(F1) and firm 2 (F2) do not have to take into account any fixed
cost when they operate their domestic plant in country 1 or 2. We therefore follow the
approach of Motha and Thisse (1994) by assuming that firms are already established in their
home country when the game begins. When firms are already established in their home
country, setting up a plant abroad involves fixed set-up costs which have already been sunk in
the domestic plant. With fixed set-up costs 1F , profit of the home firm 1, F1, is
                                                                
4 If 2( , , , , ,..., )L E nC C x q q KI D D=  where KI is infrastructure, then an additional cost difference enters in (5),
namely 
j
C d KI
KI d D
¶
¶
 where 0
C
KI
¶
<
¶
 is the reduction in costs from a marginal increase in infrastructure.
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Profit of the foreign firm 2, (F2), is
(9) 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1( ) ( , ( ), ( ), )L Ep x x x C x q D q D D F Dp = + - - ×
Factor prices for F1 are:
(10) ( )1 2 1 1 2 12 2 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) , and ( ) ( ) ( )L L L L E E E Eq D q q q D q D q t q q t t e D= + - × = + + - + - × × .
We assume that country 1, C1, the home country, is the country with lower factor prices and
hence lower TFP, i.e., 
2
0, ,k
d q
k L E
d D
> = . If F1 produces in C1 2( 0)D = , then factor prices
are 
1L
q  and 
1 1E
q t+ , and they are higher if F1 produces in C2 2( 1)D = .
In our two country case, the factor prices for F2 are:
(11)   ( )2 2 1 2 2 11 1 1 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) , and ( ) ( ) ( )L L L L E E E Eq D q q q D q D q t q q t t e D= - - × = + - - + - ×
F2 produces in C2 1( 0)D =  at higher factor prices and pays less for the factors if it relocates
1( 1)D = . FOCs for our duopoly are:
(12) 1 1 2 1 2 2 2( , ) ( , ( ), ( ), )L EMR x x MC x q D q D D=
(13) 2 1 2 2 1 1 1( , ) ( , ( ), ( ), )L EMR x x MC x q D q D D= .
We assume constant returns to scale, ( ) ( )iC x c× = × × , and rewrite  (12) and (13) as
(12’) 1 1 2 2 2 2( , ) ( ( ), ( ), )L EMR x x c q D q D D=
(13’) 2 1 2 1 1 1( , ) ( ( ), ( ), )L EMR x x c q D q D D= .
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Each firm does not migrate if marginal profit decreases after migration, i.e.,
   
( , )
0 or 0j ji i i i i i i
j j i j j j j
d x d c Dd d d x
x F
d D d D x d D x d D d D
p p p p ×¶ ¶
£ = + - - £
¶ ¶
.
Since the first term is zero (FOC), and the second term also because of a Cournot type
reaction hypothesis that firm j will not change its output level if firm i relocates (i.e.
0j jd x d D = ), the condition for non-migration is:
(14)
( , ) ln ( , )
0 or 0 ( )
i
j ji
F
j i j
d c D d c DF
s i j
d D x d D
× ×
+ ³ + ³ ¹
where 
i
i
F
i i
F
s
x c
=
×
 is the cost share of the set-up costs with ( , )
ii L E ii
c c q q t= + . Because of
Shephard’s lemma, total differentiation of ( )c ×  yields
(15)
( )ln ln ln lni iL i E i iL E
j i i j i i j j
q L q t Ed c d q d q c
d D x c d D x c d D D
× + ¶
= + +
× × ¶
 .
For the rate of country-wise difference in total factor productivity we assume
2
ln
0
c
D
¶
<
¶
           and 
1
ln
0
c
D
¶
>
¶
.5
An unit of output, produced by F1 in C2 instead of in C1, can be produced at lower costs
because of higher TFP, given factor prices from C1. An unit of output, produced by F2 in C1
instead of in C2, will be produced at higher costs by the same rate because TFP is lower by
that rate, given factor prices from C2. For firm i, the decision to relocate depends on the sign
of the difference in total costs:
                                                                
5 In the discrete variable case, 
2
ln c
D
¶
¶
 is approximated by 
2 2
2 20 1
1 ln ln
2 D D
c c
D D= =
æ ö¶ ¶
ç ÷+
ç ÷¶ ¶è ø
.
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(16) ,
ln ln ln ln
i i i
L E
F L E t i F
j j j j
d c d q d q c
s s s s
d D d D d D D
¶
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¶
where i
i
L i
L
i i
q L
s
x c
×
=
×
        and            ,
( )
iE i i
E t i
i i
q t E
s
x c
+
=
×
are the cost shares of labor and of energy. Following Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978), the
productivity term can be calculated as a residual:
(17)
,
lnln ln k
k
k L Ej j j
d qc d c
s
D d D d D=
¶
= -
¶ å
where ks  are the average cost shares of the two countries.
There are four possible market structures:
Case (1,2): F1 stays in C1, F2 stays in C2:
(18) ,
ln ln ln ln
0 or
i i i
L E
F L E t i F
j j j j
d c d q d q c
s s s s
d D d D d D D
¶
+ ³ + + ³ -
¶
.
For F1, the weighted increase in factor prices when relocating plus the set-up cost share is
larger than the cost saving from higher productivity. For F2, the weighted saving in lower
factor prices net of the set-up cost share is less than the home advantage of higher
productivity when relocating.
Case (2,2): F1 migrates to C2, F2 stays in C2.
1 2
2 1
ln ln
0 , 0F F
d c d c
s s
d D d D
+ < + ³ .
For F1, this is equivalent to
(19)
1 1,1
2 2 2
ln ln lnL E
L Et F
d q d q c
s s s
d D d D D
æ ö¶
+ < - +ç ÷¶è ø
.
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F1 migrates because the productivity advantage in C2 net of the set-up cost share justifies the
higher factor prices which have to be paid there.
Case (1,1): F1 stays in C1, F2 migrates to C1.
1 2
2 1
ln ln
0 , 0F F
d c d c
s s
d D d D
+ ³ + £ .
For F2, this is equivalent to
(20)
2 2,2
1 1 1
ln ln lnL E
L Et F
d q d q c
s s s
d D d D D
æ ö¶
+ < - +ç ÷¶è ø
.
F2 migrates because the cost savings due to lower factor prices in C1 (the left hand side of
(20) is negative by assumption) more than compensates the costs which incur when the firm
migrates, i.e. lower TFP in C1 and set-up costs.
Case (2,1): F1 migrates to C2, F2 migrates to C1.
(21)
1 2
2 1
ln ln
0 , 0F F
d c d c
s s
d D d D
+ < + <  .
F1 leaves the low cost country because higher factor prices including the set-up cost share are
more than compensated by the higher TFP in C2. F2 in turn leaves the high cost country
because lower factor prices in C1 more than compensate for the disadvantage of the low TFP
in addition to the set-up cost burden. 6
Since the production technology is by assumption the same, case (1,1) and case (2,2)
yield symmetric Nash equilibria because both firms produce with the same productivity at the
same factor prices. The case (2,1) is not an equilibrium because after migration each firm
produces at conditions identical to those of the firm which migrated because of these
conditions. It would therefore return to its previous location; i.e. it would stay there.7 In
addition, if both firms would migrate, the reaction hypothesis, that the other firm’s output is
constant, would be inconsistent. But if only one firm migrates, this reaction hypothesis is
consistent. Finally, not to relocate yields an asymmetric Nash-equilibrium.
                                                                
6 Condition (21) can only be satisfied if cost shares and relative prices differ very much.
7 If fixed costs are firm specific, that is, they are independent from the joint production technology, then a
relocation of both firms can yield an equilibrium.
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For an empirical implementation of our approach it might be useful to consider a joint
cost function with variable cost shares. A specification, used in analyzing differences in
international productivities, is a translog function. It is linear and quadratic in factor prices
and output, and the assumption on the joint cost function is that the parameters for the
quadratic terms are country-wise not different but the parameters for the linear terms are. This
implies that cost shares depend on relative prices with common parameters for their impact on
the shares, and on a constant which differs country-wise. Since the elasticities of substitution
by Allen or Morishima depend on the cost shares, they will be different under a translog joint
cost function. The condition (18) for no relocation can then be satisfied even if there are no
fixed set-up costs. It is equivalent to
1 1 2 2,1 ,2
2 2 2 2 2
ln ln ln ln lnL E L E
L Et F L Et F
d q d q c d q d q
s s s s s s
d D d D D d D d D
¶
+ + ³ - ³ + -
¶
.
Differences in the arithmetic mean of the change in factor prices with cost shares as weights
can be a reason for different locations. If the price of energy is higher in country 2, but 
2E
s  is
less than 
1E
s  due to good substitution possibilities, then it is not a location disadvantage to
stay in the high cost country. Finally, the higher the fixed cost share, the more likely it is that
(22) holds.
4. Tax Competition without Causing Relocation
The government of C1 maximizes welfare with respect to an emission tax 1t  where welfare is
the sum of profit and “environmental surplus” (tax revenue minus damage DA):8
(22) ( )
1
0
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2max ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ( ))L E
t
w p x x x x c q D q D t D D t E D DA E D= + - × + + × -
subject to the condition that the domestic firm F1 does not relocate, i.e.
 (23)
1 1
0
,1 ,1 ,1
2 2 2 2 2
ln ln ln ln ln
0L EF L E t F
d c d q d q d t c
s s s s s
d D d D d D d D D
¶
+ = + + + + ³
¶
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where 1 1,1
1 1
E
E
q E
s
x c
×
=
×
, and 1 1,1
1 1
t
t E
s
x c
×
=
×
.9 We assume that (23) was satisfied before the
introduction of an emission tax or of a tax increase. The home government can then raise 1t ,
implying 2 2 1 0d t d D d t < , until the cost disadvantage when relocating is exhausted. Since
(23) is satisfied, i.e. F1 stays in C1, 2D  is equal to zero in the objective function, i.e.
(24)
1 1
1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1max ( ) ( , , 0) ( )L E
t
w p x x x x c q q t D t E DA E= + - × + = + × -       s.t. (25)
It is argued that the drawback of a measure of welfare used is that it does not account for
possible job losses associated with a partial or total delocation (Motta and Thisse (1994)). I
personally would, however, interpret profit not as a tax base for the government or as an
income flow to the shareholders but positive profits as a signal that a firm exists which creates
jobs. If a firm makes profit abroad, it is irrelevant for the welfare measure to add a term which
represents the percentage of repatriated profit (e.g. Motta and Thisse (1994)). If a firm
delocates, jobs are lost which is more important for the country than lost profit. Our
restriction (23) expresses the interest of governments not to regulate such that jobs are lost
due to delocation. A direct interest in jobs by the government could be modeled by including
the revenue from a tax tL on labor in the objective function. Then the objective of the
government is
(25)
1 1 1
1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1max ( ) ( , , 0) ( )L E L L
t
w p x x x x c q q t D t E t q L DA E= + - × + = + × + × × - .
The monetary weight L Lt q  could also be interpreted as a shadow price or political welfare
evaluation given to an employed person in the industry.
Similarly, government in C2 chooses 2t  to maximize welfare subject to the condition
that F2 stays in C2:
(26)
2 2 2
2
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2max ( ) ( , , 0) ( )L E L L
t
w p x x x x c q q t D t E t q L DA E= + - × + = + × + × × -
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 In principle, the total value of the objective function has to be multiplied by 
1(1 )D-  because if the firm moves
to C2, welfare in C1 is zero.
9 (23) follows from (15) and (16).
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subject to
 (27)
2 2
0
,2 ,2 ,2
1 1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln ln
0L EF L E t F
d c d q d q d t c
s s s s s
d D d D d D d D D
¶
+ = + + + + ³
¶
.
For characterizing the optimum we consider the local Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The Lagrange
function for C1 is:
    
1 1
1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
ln ( , , )
( , ) ( ( , ), ( , ), ) ( )L L F
d c t t D
L t x t t x t t t t E t q L DA E s
d D
l p l
é ù
= + × + × × - + +ê ú
ë û
.
The conditions for an optimal solution 1ˆt , given 2t , are (it is 1 0xp = , the FOC of the firm):
1 1
1 2 1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 1 1
t L L
x E L E
L t t q MDA
x t t t t
p¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + + × × - ×
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
.
(28)
1
1 2 2
1 2
ln ( ; , )
0F
d c t t D
s
t d D
l
é ù¶
+ × + ³ê ú¶ ë û
It is 11
1
d DA
MDA
d E
=  the marginal damage due to emissions from burning fossil fuel E. In
addition, restriction (23) must be satisfied, i.e
(29)
1
2
ln
0F
d c
L s
d Dl
= + ³
Additional conditions are
(30)
11
0tt L× =
(31) 0Lll × = .
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Let us first consider the case when ˆ 0l =  is a solution. The inequality (23) need not be
binding at the optimal tax 1ˆt ; i.e., it is 1
1 2
2
ˆln ( ; )
0F
d c t t
s
d D
+ >  and the domestic location is not
endangered at 1ˆt . The structure of the tax can be derived from the implicit reaction function
(28):
(32)
1
1 2 1
2 1 1
1 1
1
1
ˆ
L L
x L
t q
x t t
t MDA
E
t
p¶ ¶ ¶
+ × ×
¶ ¶ ¶
= -
¶
¶
.
This is the strategic tax of the Brander/Spencer type with 1 1tˆ MDA<  because of
1 2 1
2 1 1
0, 0, 0
x L
x t t
p¶ ¶ ¶
< > <
¶ ¶ ¶
 and 1
1
0
E
t
¶
<
¶
. From differentiating (12’) and (13’) totally we
know that 1
1
0
x
t
¶
<
¶
 and 2
1
0
x
t
¶
>
¶
; a higher tax is of disadvantage for F1. The sign of 1
1
L
t
¶
¶
 is
ambiguous. It is
1
1 1
1 1 1 E
L L x L
t x t q
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= +
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
.
If we assume that the negative output effect on labor demand from a higher tax dominates the
positive substitution effect on labor (second term) from the tax induced increase in energy
prices, then 1 1L t¶ ¶  is negative. Computable general equilibrium analyses in the context of
the double dividend hypothesis have shown that the negative output effect is stronger than the
positive substitution effect even if the tax revenue is used to reduce non-wage labor cost.
Under our assumption of weak substitution between energy and labor, the strategic effect in
(32) is enforced by the concern of the government that lost jobs imply less revenue from the
labor tax.
If ˆ 0l > , then (31) and (29) imply a tax rate 1ˆt  to prevent migration. Since marginal
damage is high, the tax should be high but only such that the firm is indifferent between
staying and relocating. Since 1ˆ 0t >  in (30), a system of two equations in 1t  and l  has to be
solved, namely (23) and (28) as equations. From (23) follows that the magnitude of the tax is
such that the difference in the tax rates makes up for the advantage in the cost of production:
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 (33)
1
0
2 1 1
,1 ,1 ,1
1 2 2 2
ln ln lnL E
t L E F
t t d q d q c
s s s s
t d D d D D
- ¶
- = + + +
¶
.
If we multiply (33) by 
1 1E
q t+ , we obtain
(34)
1 1
0
,1 1 2 ,1 1 ,1
2 2 2
ln lnˆ ˆ( ) ( )L EE t L F E E t
d q c d q
s t t s s q t s
d D D d D
æ ö¶
- = + + × + +ç ÷¶è ø
where 1 1 1,1
1 1
ˆ( )E
E t
q t E
s
x c
+ ×
=
×
 is the cost share of energy, including the tax. Because of our
assumption of constant returns to scale, the cost shares are independent on output 1x . If we
assume in addition that cost shares do not depend on prices, then (34) is linear in 1t  and 2t
(provided the productivity difference is a constant). If (34)  is solved for 1ˆt  as a function of 2t ,
(28) can be used next to solve for l .
If we finally assume that marginal damage is also high in C2, implying in principle
also a high tax 2t  such that F2 would relocate, we obtain the analogous case with 2ˆt  as a
function of 1t , and a ˆ 0l > . From (27), using 1 2
1
d t
t t
d D
= - , we obtain
(35) ( )2 2
0
,2 2 1 ,2 2 ,2
1 1 1
ln lnˆ ˆ( ) L EE t L F E E t
d q c d q
s t t s s q t s
d D D d D
æ ö¶
- = + + × + +ç ÷¶è ø
where 
2 2 2 1
( ) ( , , 0)L Ec c q q t D× = + = . If cost shares and the rate 
1
ln c
D
¶
¶
 are constant, then 2ˆt  is a
linear function of 1t  and it is 
2
1
ˆ
0
d t
d t
> . The higher the energy tax in C1, the higher 2t  can be
set as an upper limit to prevent relocation. If marginal damage is high in both countries such
that both governments will set the tax rates to their upper limit, then the simultaneous system
(34) and (35) has to be solved for 1ˆt  and 2ˆt . If cost shares and the rate of productivity are
constant, there exists one obvious solution 
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ,E Et q t q= - = -  which implies
0 0
1 2
2 1
ˆ ˆ E Ed q d qt t
d D d D
- = = - . Energy should be subsidized such that its price is zero. This race to
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the bottom is, however, not linked to the “environmental surplus” in the objective function. A
solution where damage is high and the government pays for the energy bill minimizes instead
of maximizes welfare.10 The welfare maximizing solution would obviously be the NIMBY
case, i.e. both governments are not interested in having the firm in the country. To shut down
production is the optimal solution. Therefore subsidizing energy will stop at the point where
0iw < .
Let us summarize the features of our two-stage game. The governments know the
Nash solutions of the game of the firms in quantities 1 1 2( , )x t t  and 2 1 2( , )x t t . They compete at
the first stage in taxes to control the environmental externality by mitigating at the same time
the loss of market shares to foreign competitors and by preventing the relocation of its firms.
We obtained two sets of taxes. If marginal damage does not require a tax which drives the
firm out of the country, then governments set strategic taxes below marginal damage, the eco-
dumping case. Solving the implicit reaction functions (32), 1 1 2ˆ ( )t r t= , and the analogous
function  2 2 1ˆ ( )t r t= , a Nash equilibrium in tax rates can be derived. Our second case would
require a very high tax due to high marginal damage. However, such a tax would induce the
firm to relocate. Therefore, the government chooses an upper limit of the tax which makes the
firm indifferent of staying or relocating. If the same situation prevails in the other country, the
simultaneous solution of the two conditions (34) and (35) yields a “tax” program. Since the
conditions do not depend on 1 2( , )ix t t , an explicit solution can be calculated if cost shares and
TFP are constant. The result is an extreme case of eco-dumping in terms of a total
subsidization of energy. The competition for the location completely neglects welfare and
minimizes the “environmental surplus”. In a third case, 1t  is modest and F1 will stay in the
country. Equation  (32) is then the relevant implicit reaction function. But in C2 the tax 2t  is
high and set at a level such that F2 is indifferent between staying or migrating. The response
on 1t  is determined by (35). Solving these two implicit reaction functions for 1t  and 2t  yields
an equilibrium, providing it exists and is unique.11
                                                                
10 If the cost shares and the change in productivity depend on factor prices, then the simultaneous system (34)
and (35) is non-linear in 1t  and 2t , and a solution might be not unique or does not exist.
11 Our case with indifference, i.e. 
2
ln
0
d c
d D
= , is characterized in the literature (e.g. Ulph (1997)) by a level of an
emission tax at which it would pay the firm to shut down production. This 1t T=  effectively acts as an upper
limit on the tax rates.
19
5. Some extensions
5.1 The impact of different standards on location decisions
We next assume that countries differ in terms of their standards of abating air pollution from
the burning of fossil fuel. For that purpose we assume that regulation affects the user cost of
energy by adding the cost of regulation to the price of energy. For firm 1 the user cost of
energy is then
0
2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )E E Eq D q D t D ca a D a D e= + + × ×
where 2( )a D  is the degree of abatement and 2( ( ))ca a D  are the costs of abatement measures
per unit of abated emission. They depend on the degree of abatement with 0aca >  and
0aaca > . The degree of abatement, a, represents the enforcement in pollution control. It is
defined as the ratio of emission to be abated (e.g. SO2) over the maximum SO2 pollution, i.e.
potential SO2 emissions (0 1)a£ £ . The coefficient e is an emission coefficient for SO2 (e.g.
from coal) and 0Eq  is the base price of the air polluting input. With ( )ca a  monotone
increasing in a, the user cost of energy increases over-proportional with an enforcement in
environmental regulation. This implies on the input side an increasing share of
“unproductive” material inputs to comply with regulation.
From 1 1 2 2 2( , ( ), ( ), )L EC C x q D q D D=  we can again calculate the difference in costs if
the firm in country 1 relocates:
0
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
( )L E E a
d C d q d q d t d a C
L E ca a ca e
d D d D d D d D d D D
æ ö ¶
= + × + + × + +ç ÷ ¶è ø
.
Written in logarithmic changes, the firm 1 remains in country 1 if costs are higher after
relocation:
(36)
1 1 1
0
2 2 2 2
1
,
1 2 2
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
1 0
L E E
L E t
R
c a a
d C d q d q d t
s s s
d D d D d D d D
C d a C
C d D D
e
= + +
¶
é ù+ + + ³ë û ¶
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where 1 1
RC ca a e E= × × ×  are the costs of regulation and , 0c a ae >  is the elasticity of abatement
costs with respect to the degree a. The new aspect in (36) is the impact of differences in the
degree of abatement on the location decision. If the productivity aspect (last term) has offset
the first three cost components and the firm was nearly indifferent in its location choice, then
the prospect of a lower standard a in country 2 can reverse the sign in (36), which leads to
relocation. This effect is the stronger the higher the cost of regulation and the more convex the
abatement cost function is. The Nash equilibrium of the quantity game of the firms now
depends on the degrees of regulation, 1 2( , )ix a a . The objective of the government is to
maximizes welfare
1 1 1
1
1 2 1 1 1 1max ( ) ( , ) ( )L E L L
a
p x x x x c q q t q L DA E+ - × + × × -
subject to (36).
The Lagrange function for C1 is
11 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2
ln
( , ) ( ( , ), ( , ), ) ( ) ( ())L L
d C
L a x a a x a a a t q L DA E
d D
l p l
é ù
= + × × × - × + ê ú
ë û
where ( )×  includes the arguments of the cost function, i.e. 1 1 2( , ), Lx a a q  and 1( )Eq a . The
conditions for an optimal degree of abatement 1ˆa , given a2, are:
(37)
1 1
1 2 1
1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 2
ln
0Ea L L
x q L E d C
L E t q MAD
x a a a a a d D
p
l
é ù¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= - + × - + ³ê ú¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ë û
.
Additional conditions, besides (36), are
(38)
11
0 0aa L Lll× = × = .
We first consider the case ˆ 0l = , that is marginal damage is not high enough and foreign
regulation (a2) is not lax enough so that the domestic location is not endangered at 1ˆa . As
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1 1( )Eq a ca a ca e¢¶ ¶ = × + , we obtain from (37) an implicit reaction function for a1,
expressed in terms of marginal abatement costs:12
(39)
1
1 1 1 2
1
1 1 2 1
1 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
L L
E L x
MDA t q
a a x a
ca a a ca a
e E
p¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
- × -
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
¢ × + =
×
.
Marginal abatement cost and therefore a1 will increase with marginal damage, but the
environmentally justified degree a1 will be reduced because a stricter regulation leads to less
jobs (second term in (39)) and lower profits due to the loss in market shares (third term).
If ˆ 0l > , the unknown degree of abatement a1 can be calculated from (36), stated as
an equality. The “best response” 1 1 2ˆ ( )a a a=  is a less strict regulation in spite of high
marginal damage. Although regulation was laxer anyway from an environmental point of
view because of concerns about jobs and competitiveness, it is even laxer now because of
concern about the relocation. Similarly as in the tax case, if the other country is also
concerned about relocation of its industry, there might be a race to the bottom in terms of low
degrees of abatement.
5.2 A Duopoly with Multi-Location Options
We still consider two firms which produce a homogeneous good for the world market with
1 2( )p p x x= +  as the inverse demand function. They can, however, choose among n
locations where to produce their output level , 1, 2ix i = . In that case, firm 1 maximizes
1
0
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,
1
max ( ) ( , ( ), ( ) ( ), )
n
L E j jx j
p x x x C x q D q D t D D D Fp - - - -
¹
= + - + - ×å
where 1 2 3: ( , ,..., )nD D D D- = . Similarly, firm 2 maximizes
2
0
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,
2
max ( ) ( , ( ), ( ) ( ), )
n
L E j jx j
p x x x C x q D q D t D D D Fp - - - -
¹
= + - + - ×å
                                                                
12 For more detail see the Appendix.
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where 2 1 3: ( , ,..., )nD D D D- = . The firms can produce at any location; if they produce at
home, then 1D-  and 2D-  are zero-vectors. If they produce at location 0i , then 0 1iD =  and
0iD =  for 0i i¹ . Fixed costs ,i jF  differ among locations because of differences in distance,
prices for land or financial conditions. The two FOC are (i = 1, 2):
0
1 2( , ) ( ( ), ( ) ( ), )i L i E i i i iMR x x c q D q D t D D- - - -= +
and the equilibrium output levels can be written as 1 1 2 2( ( ), ( ))ix t D t D- - . Given the differences
in factor prices, government i can influence profit, market share and location decision by
choosing ti, knowing the difference in regional tax rates, i.e. ( )i i i j j
j i
t D t t D-
¹
= + D ×å .
Similar to (14), the non-migration condition is:
(40) ( ) ,( ( ), ( ), ) 0i jL i E i i
j i
Fd
c q D q D D
d D x- - -
+ ³ .
Since we consider a situation where firm i produces at location i before the two government
consider to raise taxes, the inequality in (40) holds for all j. The margin for a tax increase is
given by the minimum of the cost advantages to all regions. Let j1 be the region where the
cost advantage is smallest, i.e. the likelihood for relocation is highest. The objective of
government 1 is now:
(41)
1 1 1
1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1max ( ) ( , ) ( )L E L Lt w p x x x c q q t t E t q L DA E= + - × + + × + × × -
subject to
(42)
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
0
, ,1 ,1 ,1 ,
ln ln ln ln ln
0L EF j L E t F j
j j j j j
d c d q d q d t c
s s s s s
d D d D d D d D D
¶
+ = + + + + ³
¶
.
In an analogous way, region j2 is the region where the cost advantage of country 2 is smallest.
Therefore, D1 in (27) has to be replaced by 
2j
D .
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We conclude that the implicit reaction functions for the tax rates do not change if the
relocation restriction are not binding. If one restriction is binding, e.g. (42), then 
11
( )jt t t=
follows from (42). The tax rate is independent on t2 if j1 is not country 2. Environmental
policy in country j1 where the competitor is not located at determines the tax rate. This tax
rate influences 1 2( , )ix t t , but strategic tax rate 2ˆt  is not strategic any more because 2ˆt  has no
impact on the environmental policy of country 1.
5.3 ECO-Dumping to Attract the Foreign Firm
If countries differ in marginal damage, the country with the low marginal damage might set a
low emission tax to make it profitable for the foreign firm to relocate. The government of
country 1 could choose a level of 1t  such that
(43) 2 1
2
( , )
0
d c D
F
d D
×
+ ³      as well as      1 2
1
( , )
0
d c D
F
d D
×
+ < ,
i.e., F1 stays within the country and F2 decides to relocate, given 2t  in country 2. If 1t  is such
that (43) holds, the market structure is a symmetric duopol producing in C1. The inequality
conditions are (see (23) and (27)):
(44)
1 1
0
1
,1 ,1 ,1
2 2 2 2 2
ln ln ln ln ln
0L EF L E t F
d c d q d q d t c
s s s s s
d D d D d D d D D
¶
+ = + + + + ³
¶
and
(45)
2 2
0
,2 ,2 ,2
1 1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln ln
0L EF L E t F
d c d q d q d t c
s s s s s
d D d D d D d D D
¶
+ = + + + + £
¶
,
where we have replaced for mathematical reasons (Kuhn-Tucker) the strict inequality
condition 2
1
0
d c
F
d D
+ <  by < .13 If the inequality conditions (44) and (45) are satisfied, both
                                                                
13 The indifference situation as a reason to relocate could be justified, if at all, by the expectation of F2 that the
government of C1 is highly interested in job creation for its labor force and will provide the environment at low
costs also in the future.
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firms produce in C1 and the welfare maximizing problem of its government is:
(46) [ ]
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1max 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 2 (2 )L L
t
p x t x t x c t E t q L DA E× - × + × + × × -
subject to (44) and (45). The Lagrange function for the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is:
       [ ] [ ]
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( , , ) 2 ( ( ), ) 2 2 (2 ) (44) (45)L LL t x t t t E t q L DA El m p l m= + × + × × - + -  .
The condition for an optimal tax 1t , given 2t  in (44) and (45), is:
(47) [ ] [ ]
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 (43) (44) 0t L L
E L E
L t t q MDA
t t t t t
l m
æ ö¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= × + × - × × + - ³ç ÷¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶è ø
(48) [ ](44) 0Ll = ³
(49) [ ](45) 0Lm = - ³
and
(50)
11
0 , 0 , 0tt L L Ll ml m× = × = × = .
There are four possible solutions:
The case 0, 0l m= =  implies that marginal damage is (seen to be) low in C1. The tax 1t  is
low and both firms will produce in C1, given 2t . The tax follows from (47), i.e., MDA is
adjusted downwards by the job creation aspect:
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
ˆ
L L
L
t q
t
t MDA
E
t
¶
×
¶
= -
¶
¶
If we had dropped this aspect, 1ˆt  would have been a first best Pigou tax. The intuition is that
the tax corrects the environmental externality, and other externalities like relocation of
domestic firms or attracting foreign firms require no additional policy aspect. Since both firms
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produce in one country, there is no need for additional eco-dumping in order to gain market
shares on a third market.14
In case of 0l ¹ , 0m = , marginal damage is high in C1 and so is 1ˆt . The tax follows
from (34) which is equivalent to (44) as equation  and makes F1 indifferent with respect to its
location decision. F2 considers 1ˆt  as low compared to 2t  and relocates.
If  0, 0l m= ¹ , F1 considers 1ˆt  as low and will not migrate. If 1ˆt  is compared to 2t ,
however, F2 has to be attracted by a lower tax than 1ˆt  which follows from (45) as indifference
condition, i.e. from its equivalent condition (35).15
Finally, if   0l ¹ , 0m ¹ ,  1ˆt  had to solve simultaneously (44) and (45) as equalities.
Environmental damage matters in C1 but not so much in C2. The upper limit for 1t  is to
achieve indifference for the domestic firm ( 1ˆt  from (44), i.e. from (34)), and disregard the idea
to attract the foreign firm.
It is obvious that a tax competition between the two governments to attract both firms
would imply the indifferent solution. The inequalities, equivalent to (43), if the government in
C2 maximizes welfare, are
(51) 1 22 1
1 2
( , ) ( , )
0 , 0
d c D d c D
F F
d D d D
× ×
+ ³ + <
which are just the opposite inequalities compared to (43). The solution of the tax game
implies indifference of both firms, i.e. 1ˆt  and 2ˆt  have to solve the equalities (44) and (45).
These equalities are the same as discussed in section 4 when we solved (34) and (35) for a full
subsidizing of energy. This was not an equilibrium and implied that each firm stays in its
country or should be shut down. This result is obvious because if one government succeeds in
attracting both firms, welfare in the other country would be zero. Such an outcome could be
optimal for both countries only when environmental damage from production at one of the
locations is so high that welfare would be negative. Therefore, if both governments want to
attract the firms and welfare remains positive, they end up in paying for the energy bill. If we
                                                                
14 Note that there is no tax game between the governments because the government of C2 is passive and sticks to
t2.
15 Since indifference is not enough to attract F2 if it has already set up a plant in C2, 1ˆt   has to be somewhat
below the indifference level.
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restrict welfare of being non-negative, the size of the subsidies will be such that welfare
becomes zero.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Whether a firm wishes to relocate or to invest abroad depends, among other things, on the
framework which is provided by the government.16 To a certain extent, governments are able
to keep mobile factors of production at home if those factors can be attracted from abroad.
The purpose of this paper has been to outline an analytical framework which captures the full
scope of locational competition. Cost differences, one of the reason for migration of firms,
result from differences in factor prices, including differences in the tax system (e.g. capital or
non-wage labor cost), in human capital, in R&D expenditure, in infrastructure services, in
public goods and, finally, in total factor productivity. If cost differences are small, locational
competition controls excessive government power. In that case, a country with strict
regulation and high tax rates will suffer from its politics. We have modeled locational
competition by assuming that governments have a vital interest to keep mobile factors of
production at home. We represent this aspect by restricting the level of the environmental
instrument such that it will exhaust at the utmost the cost difference to a competing country. If
cost differences are significant, then threats to relocate are not credible, i.e. there is no binding
restriction for the cost-benefit calculus of a national environmental policy. In that case the
government will tax according to marginal damage, but adjusts this tax rate downwards to
shift profit from the foreign to its domestic firm in addition to maintaining labor income of its
residents under the lower economic activity. If small cost differences do not allow taxation
according to marginal damage, then locational competition restricts the scope of action of the
government and a relocation indifference restriction is used to exhaust the possibility of at
least a small environmental tax. In an extreme case when both countries are confronted with
relocation, even a subsidy of energy is a thinkable means to keep the firms from migration.
Our approach to locational competition was based on the consideration that governments are
not interested in inducing mobile factors to leave the country. Through this assumption we
circumvented the fact that physical capital is completely mobile ex ante when capital is not
yet embodied in machinery, but it is almost immobile ex post. Our plan for future research is
to model mobility of new capital, i.e. investment, while running the domestic plant without
reinvesting in machinery. This aspect implies increasing returns to scale of the new, but small,
                                                                
16 See Siebert (1999) for aspects on locational competition.
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foreign plant and requires a more complex analysis. However, before one starts with such an
approach, empirical investigations should indicate that firms really set up plants in foreign
countries because of a strict environmental regulation at home.
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Appendix
Proof of (38):
From (37) follows:
1 1 1 2
1
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if we assume again that the negative output effect on labor dominates the positive substitution
effect on labor from the higher cost of energy. Finally, it is 1 2
2 1
0
x
x a
p¶ ¶
<
¶ ¶
 because the
competitor’s output increases with stricter regulation in country 1 which depresses 1p .
